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The paper explores Thomas Christiano’s conception of international 
legitimacy. It argues that his account fails to fully appreciate the 
instrumental constraints that international legitimacy imposes on 
national democracies. His model of Fair Voluntary Association articulates 
the transmission of political legitimacy through a double aggregation of 
political consent. First, it “pools” its authority from the foundational 
cosmopolitan claims of individuals involved in a deeply interdependent 
social world; it then translates this source of legitimacy to international 
organizations through state consent. However, this model fails to enforce 
compliance with the cosmopolitan standards and commitments regarding 
vulnerable populations. The paper argues (i) that the global standards of 
legitimacy operate as objective criteria of instrumental legitimacy for the 
reflective evaluation of democratic states, (ii) that the demand of consistent 
compliance with these cosmopolitan goals imposes external constraints 
on the institutions of domestic democratic deliberation; and finally, (iii) 
that if democratic states fail to implement reforms in this direction, then 
their citizens have the legitimate prerogative to disaggregate their 
cosmopolitan contribution and direct it to the global institutions that 
officially realize these goals.
Keywords: International legitimacy, global justice, cosmopolitanism, 
democracy, equality, Christiano.
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1. GLOBAL LEGITIMACY AND STATE CONSENT
What is the most legitimate form of global authority we can reasonably 
hope for? Thomas Christiano (2010) presents an insightful exploration of 
this challenging question. His essay contrasts the aspiration to democratize 
international institutions directly and a defense of a Fair Democratic 
Association (FDA) among states as the best feasible option. He thinks an 
empirical evaluation of the required preconditions for the development of 
a legitimate democratic regime favor the latter. Such conditions presuppose 
equality of stakes among all those bound by the political system. Here, to 
have roughly equal stakes means that the same political system shapes 
and affects one’s main interests with an overall intensity equivalent to that 
affecting other fellow members. This shared subjection and participation 
varies across different issues and topics but the overall balance of trade-
offs must be equivalent. Therefore, all members subjected to this political 
decision-making authority have strong reasons to identify their wellbeing 
and prosperity with the goods and services regulated by the public 
authority. This is what Christiano calls “a common world”. Therefore, the 
condition of equality of stakes requires the existence of deep 
interdependency among co-members. 
Once this condition of equality of stakes is met, Christiano then defends 
his conception of legitimacy for the decision-making structure that 
regulates the deep interdependency of a group that shares a strong interest 
in enjoying a common world. The question then is: by what right should 
any of these individuals accept the decisions imposed on them? Christiano’s 
conception of public equality defends that the strongest reasons to accept 
the political authority under these circumstances are those that reflect 
that the political decision-making advances the interests of all members in 
an equal way. Christiano’s conception expresses the intrinsic value of 
collective self-government by minimizing the chances of over-inclusion 
and under-inclusion. Therefore, the distribution of political influence has 
to prevent that those not relevantly affected by a problem could impose the 
solution on those affected. Among members, this risk is neutralized in the 
overall tradeoffs of the political game within a common world. When 
distinctive minorities have stable preferences that only contingently and 
tangentially align themselves with the hegemonic view, then there is a risk 
of consistent subordination to majoritarian interests. The existence of 
permanent minorities undermines public equality because it publically 
manifests a breach in the mechanisms of inclusion, access, interaction, 
and deliberation “in a common world”.
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This is, however, as Christiano states, a cosmopolitan moral principle, 
insofar as all individuals’ interests affected by the political system are 
given equal consideration (2010: 121). To put it in different terms, the 
conception of public equality holds that all equal stakeholders under a 
political order should be equal shareholders in decision-making.
However, for Christiano, the proper political realization of a 
cosmopolitan principle of equal consideration is not a global democracy. 
The implementation of a democratic system for a global order beyond the 
nation-state would not track asymmetries in stakes and would create 
permanent minorities. According to Christiano, the state community 
seems to be the most realistic scope for the realization of public equality. 
Consequently, the most legitimate form of global authority that we could 
reasonably hope for is a Fair Democratic Association (FDA) of highly 
representative states, legitimized through the consent of its sovereign 
members. Therefore, specific matters and particular interests that 
transcend the limits of the common world are better dealt with through 
specific negotiations and agreements that represent the expected 
contributions and compensations among the affected parties. 
We could reconstruct the normative structure of Christiano’s proposal 
for a FDA as the articulation of three main elements:
 Voluntary Agreement: In its ideal form, a Free Democratic 
Association determines its own terms of cooperation through 
international negotiation, adjusting their complementary skills, 
needs, and contributions. If the exercise of bargaining power 
differentials produces unacceptable conditions, the weaker party 
can always exit the organization.  In a similar way to civil society 
associations, the legitimacy of these international associations 
rests on the voluntary acceptance of the terms of cooperation 
(“Volenti non fit injuria”). 
 Proto-Constitutional Constraints: In addition to these freely 
consented terms, Christiano admits a set of external constraints 
as principles of international society that are also justified 
through its formal value for the constitution and coexistence of 
decent and representative societies, like security and war 
conventions, the principle of honoring pacts and treaties (“pacta 
sunt servanda”), and the basic protections of ius cogens and 
human rights. This family of “traditionally observed principles” 
(customary international law) constitutes the basic scaffolding of 
the international society (Christiano 2010: 122-123). 
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 Standards of Reinforced Cooperation: A subsequent and thinner 
level in this international architecture is constituted by the 
network of institutions that articulate the cooperation around 
the goals of trade, poverty eradication, and climate change 
(Christiano 2012a: 385-390). These three dimensions represent 
an important degree of interdependence that is also crucial for 
the success of the different national societies. These areas are of 
crucial, vital interests. We can conceive this set of subjects as a 
hybrid structure that combines a voluntary bargaining process 
with proto-constitutional constrains. Treaty negotiations among 
states are still marked by the asymmetries of power, but they 
incorporate some degree of receptivity to the needs of developing 
countries, vulnerable populations or the environment as 
benchmarks (IMF), socio-environmental safeguards (World 
Bank), conventions, exemptions, etc. The degree of 
interdependence may justify a preferential treatment for 
developing countries but it is not thick enough to justify its 
regulation through a global democratic system.
According to Christiano then, moral cosmopolitanism would be 
realized through membership in a democratic state that is a member of a 
FDA. I will argue in the following sections that this articulation of 
memberships is deeply problematic. In fact, the claim that the FDA would 
reproduce some of the intrinsic obstacles to supranational coordination 
that characterize our international order of sovereign states can be 
defended. The normative structure of the FDA is based on voluntary state-
agreements, but the representative institutions of modern democracies 
are designed in ways that favor domestic interests over foreign duties. 
Therefore, there is an institutional design problem that prevents the 
realization of moral cosmopolitanism through double membership.
2. PUBLIC EQUALITY AND MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM 
Christiano’s conception of public equality cannot overcome the problem 
of articulation between national citizenship and cosmopolitan 
responsibility. In order to show this difficulty, I will compare three 
alternative understandings of the condition of public equality as a 
realization of moral cosmopolitanism: a) as an existential condition; b) as 
a criterion for legitimacy; and c) as a prescriptive duty of justice. The 
existential reading states that stakes-equality is a (sufficient) condition for 
the implementation of public equality. As a criterion of legitimacy, the 
principle demands that democratic membership be coextensive with the 
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scope of stakes-equality. Finally, the prescriptive interpretation just 
affirms a moral duty to establish a maximally inclusive institutional order 
in which all individuals could see their interests affected and taken into 
account in an equal way. These alternative readings imply concomitant 
qualifications on the scope of public equality.  
As an existential condition, it identifies the scope of the doctrine following 
the factual conditions of the world. The pre-existing institutional scope 
limits the set of individual claims to equal political influence. The validity 
of these claims is intrinsic to a practice that regulates the sphere of politi-
cal membership, it is constitutive of its network of interactions, it is em-
bedded in its relational structure of interdependence, and it is incorporated 
in the expectation of iterated, reciprocal cooperation. This social world 
constitutes the type of relevant interests shared by all relevantly affected, 
and they differ in kind and intensity from those of outsiders. Consequently, 
the validity of their claims to participation in the decision making differs 
also in kind and intensity. Even if affected, outsiders cannot be equally af-
fected in the same way as constitutive members; therefore, equality 
demands that their claims are subject to specific qualifications. 
This interpretation of the intrinsic value of democracy assumes the ex-
istence of a common world and derives the legitimacy of the democratic 
system from the “pooled rights of all persons to have a say in the common 
world they live in” (Christiano 2010: 122). This is a cosmopolitan value 
insofar it rests on the moral personality of all individuals that are “pooled” 
together as demos. However, the criteria for inclusion and exclusion are not 
cosmopolitan in the sense that it cannot be claimed that they are inde-
pendent from the social, cultural, and national characteristics of individu-
als. If we consider that it is the identification of the precondition of equal 
stakes, which determines the scope of the demos, then these structural and 
institutional factors have a determining role in the configuration of the 
common world. If the common world reflects these particularities, and the 
projects and interests of the members are intertwined with its reproduc-
tion, then the constituency is shaped by the common world, and the kind, 
type, and nature of the interests affected is distinctively and idiosyncrati-
cally determined by the internal conditions of this community. Every deeply 
interdependent political system expresses a common world which should 
be regulated in a way that reflects public equality. But the reproduction of 
this common world becomes a constitutive feature of the conceptions of 
the good of the citizenry. This general interest becomes the national inter-
est.  Additionally, under this reading, the realization of the values of 
freedom and equality could be conceived as the allegiance to the 
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institutions that produce a particular vivere libero. Therefore, the existen-
tial condition of equality of stakes may model the latent cosmopolitan 
value of democracy in a republican-communitarian way. This means that 
the factual dependence on the existing structures of interdependence im-
prints a domestic and status quo bias in democratic deliberation.
The second interpretation is related to the question of global pluralism. 
It defends the view that wherever the equality of stakes condition obtains, 
the only legitimate form of political authority is one that expresses public 
equality. The emphasis here lies in the range of acceptable political 
regimes. Christiano argues elsewhere for a pro tanto human right to 
democratic self-determination, but not for its external and forceful 
imposition through military intervention (Christiano 2011). The 
justification offered for this range of permissible toleration is congruent 
with the conception of public equality: occupied peoples have no resources 
to check that the “liberating” forces treat their interests equally in a public 
and justifiable way. For that, interventionist forces would need to be 
subjected to a common supranational authority, which as discussed in the 
essay commented on here, would also lack the conditions for direct 
democratic governance. This observation, which aims to protect weaker 
parties from foreign domination, can be extrapolated to other dimensions 
of necessary cooperation to achieve effective self-government. Depending 
on the mercy of strangers to realize democratic self-determination may 
easily lead to being at the mercy of strangers. The argument in favor of a 
right to self-determination implicitly admits that without explicit 
thresholds and impartial supervision, cosmopolitan duties remain 
unaccountable. If the commitment with the protection and promotion of 
self-determination is real, then the system of cooperation cannot be 
entirely voluntary.
The third reading of the equal stakes condition is the more problematic 
one. In contrast to the previous two, it defends a prescriptive cosmopolitan-
ism. This normative claim demands an inclusive extension of the basic 
structures of relational interdependence to a global scale. Cosmopolitanism 
then becomes an imperative duty of justice. A strong version of this pre-
scriptive interpretation would hold that our deeply exclusionary global 
order is the product of a permanent minority that keeps a vast majority of 
the global population in conditions of segregation. Global inequality of 
stakes just tracks the disproportionate vested interests of these privileged 
populations in the distribution of goods and services. Therefore, the insti-
tutional political order should offer conditions for deeper global integration 
and substantive reparations. The conditions for self-determination must be 
justified against this ideal background of global equalization of stakes.
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These three critical renderings of Christiano’s condition of public 
equality show some of the difficulties in the articulation of an intrinsic 
conception of democratic legitimacy with cosmopolitan commitments. 
The existential premise produces a domestic bias; the legitimacy condition 
tends to tolerate scenarios of under-realization; and the prescriptive 
interpretation demands a strong justification for any permissible departure 
from an ideal standard of global democracy. 
Although it is easy to share Christiano’s reasonable concerns regarding 
global democracy, it is also easy to underestimate the external limitations 
of state consent for the realization of cosmopolitan goals. Our status quo 
bias contributes to the naturalization of the global cost of practical 
unaccountability and under-fulfillment of external duties. Legitimation 
through explicit state consent contributes to the tacit legitimation of the 
consequences of its intrinsic limitations.
Christiano is aware of the weak spots of an intrinsic conception of 
democratic authority and is open to the implementation of corrective 
mechanisms if they have sufficient instrumental justification. These 
internal limits can be compensated with outcome standards (minimum 
preference satisfaction), a bill of rights, and judicial review (Christiano 
2008: 260-300). The case of the external limits however, presents specific 
challenges to the conception of legitimate authority in sovereign 
democracies. The tacit legitimation of the under-fulfillment of the duties 
to non-citizens cannot be countered through the usual corrective factors 
like political competition, electoral sanctions, public exposure, or 
reputational challenge (Christiano 2012b). Unlike domestic limits where 
those affected have a say, in the case of foreign responsibilities, neglect is 
overlooked or tacitly rewarded. Addressing the challenge of the external 
limits of democratic authority implies that Christiano’s remarkable 
conception would need to take a substantive instrumental turn and subject 
domestic deliberation to de-centering mechanisms. 
This paper defends that external limits to democratic authority (duties 
to non-citizens) also justify corrective institutional reforms. In particular, 
it defends that the external standards embedded in the FDA should be 
incorporated for the instrumental assessment and cosmopolitan 
legitimation of domestic democracies. State consent as a criterion for 
international legitimation must be qualified not only regarding the internal 
representativeness of the states, but also according to their cosmopolitan 
performance. The case of climate change will help us explore the 
cosmopolitan deficits in democratic deliberation and state consent.
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3. INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE AND INSTRUMENTAL 
AGENCY
We all have important stakes in the stabilization of climate, though some 
countries may behave irresponsibly regarding their level of emissions. 
Christiano (2015) acknowledges that the model of universal state consent 
may produce inefficient results when it has to accommodate these non-
cooperative states. In this case, Christiano admits that it may be legitimate 
to sacrifice the requirement of universal state adhesion in favor of a 
coalition of the willing with the capacity to coerce the irresponsible states 
into compliance. However, this alternative club model would be 
legitimatized by the moral value of the goal itself, not by their limited club 
consent. This would be a case of instrumental legitimacy applied to 
international organizations. This case of legitimate interference also 
shows that the states affected by the sanctions system have their 
international legitimacy undermined due to their inobservance of some 
global goals that weren’t actually validated and specified through binding 
treatises (the universal method). Therefore, the objectivity of this goal 
derives from a hypothetical reconstruction of a counterfactual Fair 
Democratic Agreement among reasonable states. Their legitimacy is 
related to the implementation of a hypothetical agreement that no party 
could reasonably reject. Here the club would act as a legitimate state 
agency or court, trusted with instrumental authority to impose duties on 
less reasonable parties.  
Part of the normative appeal in climate change negotiations consists in 
that national emission rights are calculated according to the population 
on a per capita basis. Therefore, there is a cosmopolitan dimension implicit 
in state consent. On the other hand, state consent is an unsatisfactory 
design for the introduction of considerations of historical compensations 
and reparations. States represents national interests through their 
executive branches in international fora, but these agreements usually 
need domestic ratification. This process of accountability is designed to 
prevent that a president could favor foreign over national interest. This risk 
is kept in check by parliamentary representatives that also have an intrinsic 
interest in maximizing the interests of their local constituencies. 
Consequently, there is an institutional limit to what even the most 
enlightened democratic leader can concede. The terms of treaty-making, 
be they universal or club-based, are constrained by the epistemic and 
deliberative conditions of domestic constituencies.
Even self-determining democracies may fall short of recognizing these 
global duties due to the representative and cognitive limitations of the 
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national public sphere. These limitations are particularly salient in the 
case of climate change, where the effects occur on long term scales and 
where individual contributions are embedded in habitual life-styles of the 
domestic common world. National representative systems are hijacked by 
an electoral short-termism and biased against foreigners and future 
generations. The problem of climate change negotiations is a good case to 
defend the introduction of a level of parliamentarian representation in 
international institutions beyond the national identification of the 
citizenry. This additional chamber of cosmopolitan deliberation may 
complement state negotiations and help reframe the terms of consent. 
Although democratic governance in international institutions may be an 
ideal goal, there is room for mixed regimes that may reinforce the 
cosmopolitan legitimacy of state consent, like population weights, 
consultative chambers, and further parliamentarization.
The forceful imposition of an emissions-reduction regime through the 
club model implies that, if representative states have their sovereign 
legitimacy undermined for failing to realize global goals, the counterpart 
is also true, i.e. that representative states become more legitimate according 
to their instrumental contribution to global goals. Therefore, democratic 
systems should incorporate instrumental constraints in their intrinsic 
legitimacy. This means that the legitimacy of its consent depends on a 
public deliberative system that incorporates de-biasing mechanisms that 
take into account global duties. 
4. GLOBAL LEGITIMACY AND COSMOPOLITAN 
DISAGGREGATION
Climate change presents a hard case due to the difficulty of establishing a 
fair distribution of burdens. Despite the uncertainty surrounding climate 
change, most of its unwelcome consequences are worsened by the existing 
rates of global poverty and human vulnerability. These global disasters are 
the recurrent subject of official declarations, specific agendas, and global 
programs. Let’s take for example the case of an established normative 
consensus, like the international agreement to contribute 0.7% of GNI to 
development aid. Let’s suppose that this global goal is a fixed reference 
point legitimized through state consent. This agreement is invested with 
the intrinsic legitimacy of the consenting parties, but once established, it 
also becomes an objective standard for the evaluation of the parties’ 
performance. Year after year, every state deliberates about its budget 
allocations and the weight given to the fulfillment of its global duties. With 
some exceptions, the trend is consistently disappointing. Democratic 
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regimes systematically neglect their aid duties because, as they are not 
given an equal stake in the deliberation, or sufficient representation in 
electoral campaigns, public opinion, or the media, their interests are easily 
overshadow by the electorate’s more parochial concerns. But if we agree 
that global duties constitute external standards of legitimacy, then 
representative systems that are intrinsically biased against the fulfillment 
of these obligations cannot be fully legitimate.
Global duties related to subsidiary responsibilities regarding basic 
human rights and development belong to the proto-constitutional 
architecture of global legitimacy. They can be justified as contributions to 
the consolidation of representative communities in which the affected 
individuals can see their interests realized as members of their common 
world. Additionally, aided states would become members of the 
international community and would contribute as bona fide members to a 
global architecture of cooperation. When states systematically neglect the 
duties of global contribution they also undermine the very concept of state 
consent as an intrinsic source of international legitimacy. Consequently, 
we can no longer sustain that a plurality of representative states is the best 
incarnation of the democratic value of moral cosmopolitanism. The 
systematic infra-realization of the global duties of their citizens undermines 
the egalitarian moral standing that is the foundational value of the 
democratic conception of public equality. 
Christiano concedes that some of the most decisive international 
organizations publicly show unequal concern for the interests of the 
developing countries and that this consistent feature would support some 
preferential treatment for them in their institutional design (Christiano 
2012a: 385). This diagnosis assumes that there are limits to voluntary 
agreement (hard bargain). If there are independent moral red-lines that 
frame the deliberations of the basic international organizations, then they 
should be embedded in the global institutional structure. Consistently, 
these red-lines should constrain and reflexively reconstitute the internal 
architecture of the bona fide members of the global community. Global 
duties of development aid are constitutive imperatives of a global 
community which their ultimate constitutive members are individuals 
with an equal moral status. Therefore, common worlds and institutional 
political designs that are intrinsically biased against the realization of 
these global duties cannot be compatible with the global framework of 
legitimization. 
If we hold with Christiano that an international system of democracies 
is the best incarnation of moral cosmopolitanism, then we will need to 
revisit the idealized independence of the multiple common-worlds and 
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their intrinsic conceptions of legitimacy. The ideal of democratic self-
determination must be conceived within the institutional constrains of 
global justice. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the legitimacy of a 
political system also in accordance with its capacity to progressively 
implement more demanding standards of justice and, at least, not to block 
the reform efforts. These minimal conditions of gradual perfectibility, 
generally applied to the precarious legitimacy of international institutions, 
should also be reflexively incorporated into their state members. Otherwise, 
the conception of public equality isolated from this external evaluation 
would be more appropriately defended as a republican-communitarian 
expression of thick social equality, and not as a cosmopolitan value. It 
justifies allegiance to the institutions that create conditions of public 
equality and freedom, but it does not face its intrinsic limitations to make 
these conditions available for all.
If the democratic system embraces the normative ideal of moral 
cosmopolitanism as the foundational conception for the “pooling of 
individual rights and interests”, but its representative system repeatedly 
neglects the counterpart global duties linked to this conception, then 
individual members are being accomplices in the systematic neglect of the 
duties owned to their foreign equals. Individual citizens are therefore 
participants in a system of political authority that publically contributes to 
the global subordination of the legitimate interests of outsiders. Even those 
citizens aware of the depth of this institutional violation of the equal moral 
status of outsiders know that the articulation of the domestic space of 
public opinion and political deliberation is designed in a way that 
normalizes the disregard of global duties and over-represents the domestic 
electoral interests. Claims for internal reform of the system in line with an 
effective accountability for global duties also face similar hurdles. 
Therefore, the condition of progressive perfectibility is not realized for 
domestic representative systems and their claims to full political legitimacy 
must be qualified.
Why should a citizen then comply with a political order that undermines 
the claims of moral equality? From the previous account we could derive 
that it is prima facie justified to question the legitimacy of the national 
taxation authority. Taxation is, after all, one of the main aggregative 
systems that fail to pool and represent the cosmopolitan dimension of 
national membership. Under these current conditions of undermined 
international legitimacy, citizens may be justified in transferring their 
share of tax contributions to those international institutions that embed 
and realize the commonly agreed global goals. Otherwise, full compliance 
with democratic authority constitutes a violation of the moral cosmopolitan 
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status of insiders and outsiders alike. Because, “being at home in an unjust 
world cannot be a contribution to one’s wellbeing” (Cf. Christiano 2008: 63).
5. CONCLUSION
The Fair Voluntary Association model articulates the transmission of 
political legitimacy through a double aggregation of political consent. 
First, it “pools” its authority from the foundational cosmopolitan claims of 
the individuals co-implicated in a deeply interdependent social world; 
then it translates this initial legitimacy to the collective membership in an 
international organization through state consent. However, as we have 
seen, this model fails to meet global standards of legitimation. It has an 
original sin related to the historical conditions of development of the 
modern territorial system of nation states and to its idealization as isolated 
common worlds.
Christiano’s strategy is to compare two extensions of the value of moral 
cosmopolitanism that underpins democratic legitimacy, from the modern 
state to international organizations. One attempt is the direct translation 
of individual representation to democratic governance of the global 
institutions; the alternative is treaty-building through state consent. But 
the distinction is not exhaustive. None of the alternatives are perfect but 
there are intermediate and perfectible models that perform better when 
translating legitimacy and global justice: dual chambers with a popular 
parliament and a state senate, or a system of population-weighted double 
majority. The point is that a democratic state’s consent is no guaranty of 
international legitimacy, especially when dealing with claims from 
outsiders in contexts of low enforceability.
Global standards of legitimacy operate as criteria of instrumental 
legitimacy for the reflective evaluation of democratic states. The demand 
of consistent compliance with these cosmopolitan goals imposes external 
constraints on the institutions of domestic democratic deliberation. If 
reforms in this direction are not implemented, then democratic citizens 
have the legitimate prerogative of disaggregating their participation in the 
national “pool” and discharging heir cosmopolitan fair share through the 
global institutions that officially realize these goals.
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